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New Scientist 5 January 1984

9

The invisible border guard
The machine-readable passport is upon us. The British government has accepted it without public
discussion even Cough the technology carries the threat of Europe-wide surveillance of
innocent travellers
Steve Connor
"ACTION Q" may be to let the traveller pass through
B Y THE END of the decade most Westerners will carry
a passport with an extra, laminated page that will immigration control with the same blank expression that
allow more numerous and more extensive checks at greets passengers with "NO TRACE" by their names. But a
international borders. It is a page that creates the possibility record has been made that this person has passed through this
of a society where anyone can bestopped and checked until port at this time. There are plans to feed data from the passa computer elicits the statement oi"NO TRACE" before they port computer to the computers of the police or security
are allowed to go on about their bisiness. The page allows the services n o t just i n Britain, b u t throughout Europe.
"ACTION X", on
list of people who,
the other hand,
for various reasons,
would be t o stop
are labelled as susand d e t a i n t h e
picious, to expand
PASSEPoRr
traveller a n d i n almost w i t h o u t
form t h e police
limit. I t needs no
special b r a n c h ,
more information
......,......
which has partithan is contained
DUNCAN
A . . . . A..........
cular responsibility
in current passUNITED KINGDOM
for immigration
ports t o create a
control in the UK,
system a b l e t o
that the subject is
monitor fully a n
EDINBURGH
available for interindividual's moverogation.
ments inside his or
18 J U N E / J U I N 7 8 1 8 J U N E / J U I N
Of course t h i s
her home country.
,,,,,,-"'" Odle a
already happens to
The passport o f
expiry liNationalit
some extent. One
the future has a
pcceet
Me
of the reasons for
page l a m i n a t e d
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a c e
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the limitation i s
with plastics and
\
the difficulty o f
bearing seemingly
4 5 7 8<G8 <1 508570M7 8 0 6 8 8 5 U K < < < ‹ < < < < < < < « 5
monitoring every
innocuous p e r single person who
sonal details such
passes through the
as name, date o f
world's major sea
birth, nationality
and air ports. But
and identification Thenew passport pale and its machine-readable numbers. The West Germans will use
with the requirenumber. T h e s e the pageas an intend ID-card. Space has been allowed for an ID-number to be added
ment that as many
details can be read
quite freely with the naked eye; they can also be "read" by an people as possible carry machine-readable passports, then
optical character recognition (OCR) machine (Box A) that technology overcomes this limitation.
Within five years, Britain, West Germany, the United
feeds this information straight to a computer screen. Plans to
develop this technology are well advanctd in Britain, West States and most European countries will be using machinereadable passports. Since March 1981, the US has issued up
Germany and the United States.
Passport control desks are to have computer terminals, to 4 million new passports that can be read by machines. And,
safely out of sight of travellers passing through immigration in November this year, West Germany will begin to replace
control. (The first at London's Heathrow airport was installed its internal identity cards (which can be used as European
in April 1983) The officer places the laminated page into the passports) with machine-readable cards. Britain is due to act
OCR device connected to the terminal. h less than two next year and other countries in Africa, Asia, Australasia and
seconds the officer is reading the persoial details on a in South America are expected to issue the new passports
computer screen. Next to these details on thescreen is a space before the end of the decade. With the bulk of the world's
for extra information; the traveller will lot know what travellers bearing machine-readable passports, they must all
appears in this space, and the immigration Officer is trained wait for the computer to issue a "NO TRACE" response
before they can pass freely, or without the relevant police or
not to give away any secrets in a facial exprission.
The extra information will come from a computer. Most of security services of the country being involved.
the time it will read "NO TRACE". In these lases, the pass- The history of the machine-readable passport begins at a
port is handed back and the traveller passes byiln some cases meeting in Montreal in May 1968 held under the auspices of
the officer will read a coded message such as 1UBJECT OF the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). This
SC 1234 ACTION Q". This is not a fictionil message. It body, which represents the world's civil aviation authorities,
appears in an internal document sent by Bitain's Home was concerned with the dramatic increase i n passenger
Office to its immigration officers. It means thä the traveller numbers, during the previous decade, and the likely increase
must not pass without some sort o f action being taken, in the future. With machine-readable passports, i t was
because the traveller has a record on the computit The officer thought, people could pass through airports faster. The ICAO
is given an indication of what sort of record: 'SC" (suspect set up a panel of experts to investigate the problem. The
check) of the kind known as "1234". The offic.a' must then experts were drawn from Australia, France, Canada, West
obey t h e instructions already programmeC i n t o t h e Germany, India, Kenya, the US and Sweden. Later on, they
computer: "ACTION Q".
were joined b y the USSR, Britain, Belgium and the
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10

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Scientist 5 January 1984

Netherlands. Everyone, i t was said, could benefit from
shorter queues at the immigration desk.
Between 1969 and 1978, the panel held five meetings
which set out the technical specifications that each country
should follow if it wanted to adopt a machine-readable passport. The meetings were monitored by the International
Criminal Police Organisation—Interpol—not because it, too,
was interested in shorter queues at airports, but because the
new passports could help the security checking that is
performed at the world's various ports o f entry. Interpol
represented, and reported back to, the police in the countries
concerned. The ICAO's panel recommended what the new
passport should look like, what information the machine—
readable zone should contain, and what the security considerations should be.
The print on the plastic laminated card must, for example,
be able to withstand temperatures ranging from —10° C to
+50° C without loss of quality. The document should be able
to withstand even greater differences in temperature, and
should not lose its reliability when stored a t relative
humidities of 0 to 100 per cent.
More importantly, the panel decided on the standard print
to be used in the machine-readable zone at the edge of the
page. The panel formulated rules for the dimensions of this
zone, and the information that it should include. In this way,
the new passports can be read by the appropriate machine
whether in Manchester, Munich, Moscow or Miami,
The machine-readable zone consists of two lines. The page
itself is inserted into the passport and the zone becomes the
outer edge. The upper line carries the letter "P" to indicate
that it is machine-readable, the code of the issuing state and
the name of the bearer. The lower line has the passport
number, nationality, date of birth, sex, date of expiry, and a
national identification number (which is optional). The date
of birth, passport and national ID numbers have a "check
digit" at the end of each. This number is calculated using
formulae (Box B) and is a way of checking that the machine
has read the line of characters correctly and that the number
in question is valid. At the end of the lower line is a final
check digit which, applying the formulae to all the numbers
in the line, acts as a final check.
The digits also make forgeries more difficult—but not
impossible. If the plastics laminate is broken, a chemical reaction takes place involving atmospheric oxygen; the paper
darkens, making it clear that it has been tampered with. This
can be done by impregnating the card with the reduced form
of a dye. When it comes into contact with air, it oxidises and
darkens. When t h e I C A O considered these security
precautions, i t had no illusions about how effective they
would be in stopping forgeries; it clearly thought that it would
just discourage counterfeiters by making forgery unattractive
to potential criminals.
The ICAO's job was done. It had designed the standard
machine-readable passport that suited all the countries
involved; it even considered what the British Home Office
was later to describe as the "Big Brother" aspect. Instead of
having a machine-readable zone that people could not read (a
magnetic strip, for instance, like that which appears on banking cards), the ICAO agreed that the zone should have roman
letters and arabic numerals able to be read by optical character recognition. So the logic goes; no one has anything to fear
that the machine-readable passport carries information they
know nothing about.
In fact this is a sop. The machine-readable passport is
meant primarily to prove the identity of the bearer. But few
people understand that it will also give the immigration officer access to a computerised file that corresponds to the name
carried on the passport.
The Council of -Europe wants a security network based on the INPOL
computer at Wiesbaden (right). The Home Office has discussed a UK
network to help immigration control

Briein
7
BRITISHMANUAL SYSTEM
IMMIGRATION
AND SPECIAL
BRANCH
OFFICERS
WITH
SUSPECT
INDEX

MACHINE-READABLE PASSPORTS
OCR MACHNE

Hormone
;\
COMPLIERDISPLAYS PASSPORT
DETAILSAND INSTRUCTIONS
123'15678
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DATEOF I'IRY 18RIME 1988

New Scientist 5 January 1984

Bootle - N o t i o n a l immigration
computer
Hendon - N c t i o n a l police
computer
Harmondsworth - Immigration service
inteligence computer
-M15'computer
London

11

CURRENT SYSTEM
PASSPORTFACEDOWNON GLASS

F—r-1
MONITOR
Bootle

\ Hendon
_ondon

Schlphol

Bremer
Dusseldorf

;worth

Hamburg
Berlin

PASSPORT NUMBER
TYPEDINTO COMPUTER
7IMINh;•egest
LINK VIA LOCAL POLICE
COMPUTERTO INPOL

Paris re
Saarbrucken%
INTERPOL HQ
Proposed secure
telex links
with main European
police centres

iStuttgar

?
POSSIBLE LINKTO NADIS

12

New Scientist 5 January 1984

It is the information on this computer that is important in to add names and take them oft. With a computerised list,
terms of the "Big Brother" aspect—the British Home Office, changes can be made at the touch' of a button. Computers also
for one, has no intention of giving anyone but itself access to mean that a greater number o f people can be made
"suspects". A t the moment, 18 000 names is about the
this information.
At the point where the passport is inserted in the reading maximum that can be handlegin a book. With a computer
machine—the interface—the I C A O relinquishes i t s file, the Home Office can exbaid this number considerably,
responsibility. From then on, the machinations of security and it shows every sign of doing so. One internal report states
are under the control of the country in question. The ICAO that i f demand to increase i e index were met, it would
sums up the implication of its decisions more diplomatically: double within two years. Amther separate report, shown to
"The requirements will differ considerably from country to New Scientist, states that putting the suspect index on
country. For example, some countries may wish to record the computer will "assist the iirmigration officer in obtaining
inward and outward movements of all categories of travellers; very fast and effective check against a much larger suspect
some countries may wish to record the inward and outward index" (emphasis added). ['his contrasts with the Home
movements o f some categories only; and others may be Office's public utterances flat there are no plans to expand
concerned only with partial controls for specific groups."
the suspect index.
In Britain, the imminent arrival of the machine-readable
European data network
passport caused a great deal of interest in a Home Office
The Home Office says hat the suspect index is a list of
group looking into a different task. This group examined
ways of improving the suspect index—a list of people who, people "subject to immigation control". There is no doubt
one way or another, have aroused the interest of the immi- that some are criminals aid terrorists. A clue as to how wide
gration authorities. By 1980, the Home Office had decided to the index spreads comes from secret categories o f interamalgamate the suspect index with the plan to introduce national travellers o f 'articular interest t o MI5. These
machine-readable passports. As one of its internal documents include: "Passengers whohave been in a communist country
states: "One of the major benefits of an automated machine- . . . passengers in possessiaa of communist or other subversive
readable passport system is the potential for performing auto- literature or who carry aCP card . . . [and] . . . passengers of
Chinese race known or sspected to be travelling to and from
matic checks on the suspect index."
The current suspect index is a classified document, and its the People's Republic a China."
An interest in peoplearrying "subversive literature" is not
"confidential" status means it must be kept under lock and
key when not in use. For the time being, the index is a list of unique to Britain. In Wst Germany, such an interest is wide18 000 names in the form of a black, A4-sized book. It is this spread. The West Gernan border police, for instance, are
book that international travellers can sometimes see in the issued with a list of "let influenced" magazines to help them
hands o f an immigration officer standing behind the distinguish between "sspicious" and "non-suspicious" readimmigration desk and looking at the queue that forms in ing material. Cooperaon between West European countries
to exchange informtion about suspected terrorists and
front.
The Home Office is highly secretive about how people end criminals is a recurrig theme within the Council of Europe.
up on its suspect index, and the categories into which they are In a report on terrorist in Europe, the council states that "an
put. In fact, the names are supplied by the Home Office, the essential requiremen for controlling terrorism is a sophispolice, the Foreign Office, the security services (MI5), ticated intelligence-gthering system". And an integral part of
Customs and Excise, and Interpol. Next to each name on the this is tighter passpot checks "however repugnant this may
list is a coded letter: "X", for instance, means refuse entry; sound to those for whom European cooperation means
"A", "AA", and "J" are categories of interest to MI5. People making frontiers les and less relevant".
The council single out the West German police computer
in these categories are either stopped and questioned by
special branch officers, who are always present at immi- at Wiesbaden as havag made a significant "breakthrough" in
gration control, or they are allowed to pass through and the tracing terrorists at bme and abroad. This computer, which
has 10 million "item" in its data bank, is run by the Federal
border crossing is noted for the police or MI5.
The problem of having a list on paper is that it is difficult Office o f Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt o r

A: How optical character recognitiodworks
T H E machine-readable zone of the pass- reflects the images onto a photosensitive /them. The Home Office has already tested
ports'. is inserted into the reading device. detector that compares the character" two of these machines at Heathrow airport
E l
This activates a micro switch and the card being read with characters in its memory. 1, and will test more this year.
is gently gripped between rubber blocks to the two coincide then the character in
ROT
A
TI
N
G
MIRROR
prevent any movement that could distort question is read successfully. The device, .
the reading of the zone. A light inside the under test have a reading speed of abou
device illuminates the two lines of the zone 100 characters a second, and the aim is
in a uniform manner, and a rotating mirror have an error rate of less than one part
10 000.
As the zone is read, the check sums e
calculated, the details on the passport fe
flashed to a computer screen, and the .ei e n t elements—birth date, name, port number and identity number e,
sent to a computer where they are cheica
against the list of names in the sweet
index.
I
The chevrons in the machine- r e a r
zone are for blank fields. In the es!
German ID-card/passport, part of tP Is e
taken up by the national ID-numbd (3_
British passports this is left blank, alien ä
the devices being tested by the Home puce
. the principle involved
can read passports with ID numb °11
Mechanics of an OCR machine . . .
t

New Scientist 5 January 1984

1

3

a particular area. T h i s
happens a l r e a d y. D u r i n g
some demonstrations, f o r
instance, t h e p o l i c e h a v e
taken down the numbers on
the I D -cards o f people o n
buses a n d trains t h a t a r e
heading towards the protest.
The I N P O L c o m p u t e r
contains a l i s t o f wanted
persons, just as there is a list
of wanted persons o n t h e
British P o l i c e N a t i o n a l
Computer (PNC). One of the
sub-categories o n I N P O L ' s
wanted persons' file is BEFA
7K (Beobachtende F a h n dung or observation search).
A BEFA 7 K person, according t o o n e border control
officer, is one who "is found
The first immigration desk for the new passports opened at Heathrow last April; the machines read 90 somewhere with a BEFA 7
person [suspected terrorist],
per cent of the new American passports successfully; inset is a sample page
that is with an actual suspect
even if it is purely accidental,
BKA). This federal computer--called INPOL—is linked to whether it be in a train compartment, in a sleeping car or
the computers of each of West Germany's 11 regional police touring bus". Another category i n this f i l e i s B E FA 9 :
forces. Each regional force is in turn linked, via the INPOL participators in demonstrations.
machine, t o three other computers: the central registry o f
There is little doubt that information about BEFA 7K and
aliens at Cologne, the central registry of vehicles at Flensburg BEFA 9 people goes to and from the West German security
and the central registry of criminals atBerlin.
service computer, NADIS. T h i s computer is r u n b y the
West Germany also intends to introduce machine-readable Verfassungsschutz-Behoerde—the Constitution Protection
internal identification cards that every West German must,
by law, possess. The ID-card will be in the same format as the
passport envisaged by the ICAO; West Germans will also be
B: Calculating check digits
able to use them as passports within the European Commu' T H E machine-readable passport "contains only information
nity (EC). When travelling outside the E C they w i l l b e
I that can be read with the naked eye", says the Home Office.
encouraged to carry both passport and D -card.
This is true. But within the lower line of the machine-readable
West Germany automated the task of checking travellers
zone are numbers called check digits. They are not immediately
recognisable because they appear at the end of another number
entering the country some years ago. At Berlin's Tegel airthat has some relevance—date of birth, passport number or date
port, for example, each passport control point is fitted with a
of the passport's expiry. The check digits are calculated using a set
glass plate, conveniently out of sight of the passengers. A T V
of standard rules. The value of each digit depends on the number
camera lies underneath. When the passport is put on the plate
it follows. The rules have four steps:
face down, the camera relays a picture to a person operating
Step one multiply each digit in the original number (such as date
a computer terminal i n another part of the airport. T h e
of birth) by chosen numbers called weightings. The weightings
computer is connected, on line, to the local police computer,
chosen f o r machine-readable passports i s t h e series
which is in turn connected to the central INPOL computer in
731731731....
Wiesbaden. As the operator keys in the passport number that
Step two add the products of these multiplications.
Step three divide the sum by a chosen number, known as the
appears on the TV screen, the computercan give an almost
modulus. It is agreed that each country should use modulus 10.
instantaneous indication of the wanted status of the traveller.
Step four specify the remainder of this division as the check digit.
The operator conveys this t o the immigration official b y
And so, using the date of birth of I November 1955 as the
illuminating an appropriate coloured light at the official's
example. The date of birth becomes 011155. But problems can
desk o r b y telephone. During March 1976, immigration
arise as to the order of day, month and year. The US method is
officers at Tegel airport interrogated the computer 56 832
to put month first so this date becomes 110155. And to complitimes and had 172 " h i t s " = a success rate of 0.3 per cent.
cate issues further the International Standards Organisation puts
Foreigners' passports are also checked.
year first, so the date becomes 551101. We shall use the normal,
West Germany plans t o perform similar checks on the
British format for our example.
movements o f people across its borders, but this time with
Step one
original number
0
1 1 1 5 5
machine-readable passports and identity documents. Initially
weightings
7
3 1 7 3 1
40 OCR devices will be installed at airports and motorway
products
0
3 1 7 15 5
borders; by the end of the decade the figure will reach 400. At
Step two 0 + 3 + 1 + 7 + 1 5 + 5 = 3 1
present, using the system similar to the one in Berlin, only 3
Step three 3 1 + 1 0 = 3 , remainder 1
per cent of all West Germans leaving or entering the country
Step four c h e c k digit is 1.
are checked. By the end of the decade this could, in theory,
The number appears on the passport as 0111551. Similar
rise to nearly 100 per cent. By 1989 the number of machinecalculations are done for passport number, date of expiry and (in
some countries) national identification number. A final check
readable I D -cards in West Germany will reach 40 million.
digit is calculated using all the numbers in the lower line of the
Today, the West German police can stop people under a
zone, and this digit appears at the very end of the line. The
variety o f circumstances and ask to see their cards. I n the
machine that reads the zone performs these calculations almost
future, internal checking will be possible on a scale similar to
instantaneously and it is away of checking that it has "read" the
that planned f o r airports and borders. T h e OCR devices
zone correctly. It is also a way of ensuring that the passport is
themselves are relatively light and mobile; they could be set
bona fide and follows the rules.
❑
up by police at roadblocks to check who is entering or leaving

14

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Scientist 5 January 1984

West Germany provides financial role for ID-c
U T E S T G E R M A N S a r e l e g a l l y bank, for example, might ask all customers tised publipinion to data protection and
and that sensitivity is now
obliged to possess identity cards. The to produce their MRCs. I t could then
West German police have virtually total survey customer habits to help it decide cciovnilcelirneghil ith the MRC.
One nfie most criticised features of the
freedom to check the card of anyone in a how much money to hold, when to put on
public place. Anyone not carrying one may extra counter staff and when to take them new MR is that the police could store
massive ounts o f data about people
be held until they can identify themselves. off.
The new, machine-readable cards (MRCs)
The private use of MRCs is particularly under s eillance. Even the fact that an
—identical to the laminated page in the subject to heavy criticism. Hans Peter Bull individd has been asked to produce their
EC's machine-readable passport—will help is professor of jurisprudence at the Univer- card is hied to the INPOL computer file
the police make even more thorough sity of Hamburg and the past government —a pr4ice that allows the police to check
checks. MRCs will also come to the aid of watchdog on the misuse of electronic data any pion's movements.
Th uch a large amount of data can be
private business. The law introducing them by the administration. H e said: " I t is
includes "expressis verbis" permission for absolutely necessary to exclude any private store probably the weakest point of the
banks, insurance companies, building socie- misuse o f such a sophisticated control new v : i t includes no mention o f the
ties and the like to use MRCs. The owner technology. T h e arguments concerning circa. tances under which such data
has to agree to this private use which must voluntary use are misleading, because show be stored. Nor does the law cover
exclude t h e serial number o n t h e people will be forced to present their ID- coo ration between police forces and the
ID-card.
cards when they need to use the services of Conkution Protection Agency ( Ve r •All West Germans must register their companies. And there will be no other fassigsschutz-Behoerde), which is roughly
home address with their local councils; a choice when every Company has decided equialent to MI5 in Britain. Every federal
requirement that, added to the need to to use the ID-card for identification."
° e n t and the national government
l u tocmonitor
h rthe activities
n
carry an I D -card, enables the police t o
Dr Herman Schnoor, minister o f the h a an agency
check anyone very carefully. The police are interior f o r the State o f North-Rhine oflolitical extremists and terrorists. The
not allowed to ask to see the card of anyone Westphalia, shares Bull's concern: "The price and the agencies have a large degree
who i s a t home without "reasonable protection of individual rights works quite o5eedom as to whom to include as being
suspicion", but it is easy for a police officer effectively within governmental adminis- uiier "police observation". A spokesman
to be suspicious.
tration. But there is a gap in the control of id the Hamburg agency told Der Spiegel
Identity checks increase after terrorist private-sector data processing. The govern- lit August that the number o f people
attacks or a bank robbery. MRCs will allow ment's data-protection watchdogs cannot rider "police observation" had increased
internal checks to increase several times get their hands on privately held data. We
50 per cent since early 1982. He claimed
over.
should be very careful with the extension of lat up to 11 000 people can be put under
Both the private and public use of MRCs the use of ID-cards in the private sector." enervation after a terrorist attack.
are the subject of fervent debate in West
Federal and national laws protect West 1Most of the critics are not arguing against
Germany. The law is explicit about the use Germans against the misuse o f personal he technology. But they do want sophof card serial-numbers to file private data. data held by government agencies. Inde- ;ticated control mechanisms to be built
The government printer i n Berlin that pendent watchdogs can check the daily nto the law and these to be accompanied
prints the cards must destroy its record of collection, storage, processing and transfer- )5, specific c i v i l rights regulations t o
which serial number is issued to which ring of data within government depart- prevent the misuse o f data. Bull adds
card. The number may be used only by the ments. Annual reports are published on another argument: "As the police's capacity
police and local councils. This safeguard data misuse, and offenders face fines or to control has grown so large the legal base
was introduced after a decision by the even imprisonment.
for cooperation between the West German.
Constitutional Law Court in Karlsruhe two
The debate over MRCs grew out of a intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtenyears ago.
controversy last year concerning a detailed dienst) and the constitution protection
However, companies may add their own population census. Citizens were t o be !agencies should be clearly defined. This is
serial numbers to the data on the MRC. asked some v e r y personal questions, not yet the case, and it should be done
The card is fed into a reading machine, an concerning income f o r example. Some before the new ID-card system is introaccount number, say, is added to the infor- questions were so personal that even the duced."
R
o
l
f
Zell
mation and the company is free to use the most law-abiding Germans rebelled against Rolf Zell is a freelance journalist working in
card for identification or anything else. A it. Public discussion about the census sensi- Stuttgart.
Agency. A s with MI5's top-secret computer, i n London's
Mayfair, little information is available about NADIS.
The picture emerging from West Germany is one where
information on people's movements within and ()inside the
country is monitored by a series of interlinked computers.
The central police computer, INPOL, is linked to the regional
police computers, and to the three central, national registries.
And between I N P O L and NADIS, information about the
movements o f people flows quite freely, even though there
might not yet be a direct computer-to-computer link. It is for
this reason that the Council of Europe holds up the INPOL
computer at Wiesbaden as the example which other European states should follow.
The council is backing a plan t o set up a Europe-wide
computer network w i t h the Wiesbaden computer at the
centre. The network is to "exchange topical information on
the daily situation with special regard to transfrontier movements o f members o f terrorist circles . . . and to establish
secure telex lines between national police centres". A t the
centre o f this vast surveillance network i s the machinereadable passport—a document that the Home Office says
will help shorten queues at the arrivals desk of immigration
control.

But even the cdncil cannot ignore the risks that machinereadable passpordPose: "The question . . . is how far a state
can go t o imprde security without dismantling freedoms
which once gon 'may never be regained . . . And how can we
make sure t h a t e slation designed t o combat violent ters i v e l y applied to repress radical, but enonrorism is not &a
violent, opinio) o r political forces?"
In Britain,
-runcomputers is not as
e
ta
fs
o
g
k
lin
advanced as r e s t Germany. But nevertheless, the Home
Office i s c o dering connecting the passport computers
holding the mg) ect index, at air and sea ports, to its national
immigration P mputer in Bootle, Merseyside. This link could
do away w o t h e landing and embarkation cards that now
have to be lied i n by hand by people wishing to stay i n
Britain. Intag al documents show that the Home Office has
discussed a National network of computer systems" to help
immigration control. A n d there are other computers that
store inforn/ tion of use to immigration officers sitting next
to their co/ puter terminals. There is information o n the
PNC in } W o n , there is information on the immigration
services' j011igence computer i n Harmondsworth n e a r
Heathrow ind, most secret of all, there is the information on
MI5's confuter, sitting in the heart of London.
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