Das Orginal befindet sich unter [http://www.oecd.org/dsti/iccp/crypto_e.html] [LINK]. Presseerklärung der OECD vom 27.März 1997 Cryptography Policy GuidelinesRECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCILCONCERNING GUIDELINES FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY27 March 1997 THE COUNCIL,HAVING REGARD TO:
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CONSIDERING:
RECOGNISING:
AND FURTHER RECOGNISING:
On the proposal of the Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy; RECOMMENDS THAT MEMBER COUNTRIES:
ANNEXGUIDELINES FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICYI. AIMSThe Guidelines are intended:
II. SCOPEThe Guidelines are primarily aimed at governments, in terms of the policy recommendations herein, but with anticipation that they will be widely read and followed by both the private and public sectors. It is recognised that governments have separable and distinct responsibilities for the protection of information which requires security in the national interest; the Guidelines are not intended for application in these matters. III. DEFINITIONSFor the purposes of the Guidelines:
IV. INTEGRATIONThe principles in Section V of this Annex, each of which addresses animportant policy concern, are interdependent and should be implementedas a whole so as to balance the various interests at stake. No principle should be implemented in isolation from the rest. V. PRINCIPLES1. TRUST IN CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODSCRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS SHOULD BE TRUSTWORTHY IN ORDER TOGENERATE CONFIDENCE IN THE USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.Market forces should serve to build trust in reliable systems, and government regulation, licensing, and use of cryptographic methods may also encourage user trust. Evaluation of cryptographic methods, especially against market-acceptedcriteria, could also generate user trust. In the interests of user trust, a contract dealing with the use of a key management system should indicate the jurisdiction whose laws apply to that system. 2. CHOICE OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODSUSERS SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO CHOOSE ANY CRYPTOGRAPHICMETHOD, SUBJECT TO APPLICABLE LAW.Users should have access to cryptography that meets their needs, so that they can trust in the security of information and communications systems, and the confidentiality and integrity of data on those systems. Individuals or entities who own, control, access, use or store data may have a responsibility to protect the confidentiality and integrity of such data, and may therefore be responsible for using appropriate cryptographic methods. It is expected that a variety of cryptographic methods may be needed to fulfil different data security requirements. Users of cryptography should be free, subject to applicable law, to determine the type and levelof data security needed, and to select and implement appropriate cryptographic methods, including a key management system that suits their needs. In order to protect an identified public interest, such as the protection of personal data or electronic commerce, governments may implement policies requiring cryptographic methods to achieve a sufficient level of protection. Government controls on cryptographic methods should be no more than are essential to the discharge of government responsibilities and should respect user choice to the greatest extent possible. This principle should not be interpreted as implying that governments should initiate legislation which limits user choice. 3. MARKET DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODSCRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN RESPONSETO THE NEEDS, DEMANDS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INDIVIDUALS, BUSINESSES ANDGOVERNMENTS.The development and provision of cryptographic methods should be determined by the market in an open and competitive environment. Such an approach would best ensure that solutions keep pace with changing technology, the demands of users and evolving threats to information and communications systems security. The development of international technical standards,criteria and protocols related to cryptographic methods should also be market driven. Governments should encourage and co-operate with business and the research community in the development of cryptographic methods. 4. STANDARDS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODSTECHNICAL STANDARDS, CRITERIA AND PROTOCOLS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHICMETHODS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AND PROMULGATED AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALLEVEL.In response to the needs of the market, internationally-recognised standards-makingbodies, governments, business and other relevant experts should share information and collaborate to develop and promulgate interoperable technical standards, criteria and protocols for cryptographic methods. National standards for cryptographic methods, if any, should be consistent with international standards to facilitate global interoperability, portability and mobility. Mechanisms to evaluate conformity to such technical standards,criteria and protocols for interoperability, portability and mobility of cryptographic methods should be developed. To the extent that testing of conformity to, or evaluation of, standards may occur, the broad acceptance of such results should be encouraged. 5. PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATATHE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS TO PRIVACY, INCLUDINGSECRECY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA, SHOULD BE RESPECTEDIN NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICIES AND IN THE IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OFCRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS.Cryptographic methods can be a valuable tool for the protection of privacy, including both the confidentiality of data and communications and the protection of the identity of individuals. Cryptographic methods also offer new opportunities to minimise the collection of personal data, by enabling secure but anonymous payments, transactions and interactions. At the same time, cryptographic methods to ensure the integrity of data in electronic transactions raise privacy implications. These implications, which include the collection of personal data and the creation of systems for personal identification, should be considered and explained, and, where appropriate, privacy safeguards should be established. The OECD Guidelines for the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data provide general guidance concerning the collection and management of personal information, and should be applied in concert with relevant national law when implementing cryptographic methods. 6. LAWFUL ACCESSNATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICIES MAY ALLOW LAWFUL ACCESSTO PLAINTEXT, OR CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, OF ENCRYPTED DATA. THESE POLICIESMUST RESPECT THE OTHER PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE GUIDELINES TO THE GREATESTEXTENT POSSIBLE.If considering policies on cryptographic methods that provide for lawful access, governments should carefully weigh the benefits, including the benefits for public safety, law enforcement and national security, as wellas the risks of misuse, the additional expense of any supporting infrastructure, the prospects of technical failure, and other costs. This principle should not be interpreted as implying that governments should, or should not, initiate legislation that would allow lawful access. Where access to the plaintext, or cryptographic keys, of encrypted datais requested under lawful process, the individual or entity requesting access must have a legal right to possession of the plaintext, and onceobtained the data must only be used for lawful purposes. The processthrough which lawful access is obtained should be recorded, so that thedisclosure of the cryptographic keys or the data can be audited or reviewedin accordance with national law. Where lawful access is requested and obtained,such access should be granted within designated time limits appropriateto the circumstances. The conditions of lawful access should be statedclearly and published in a way that they are easily available to users, keyholders and providers of cryptographic methods. Key management systems could provide a basis for a possible solution which could balance the interest of users and law enforcement authorities; these techniques could also be used to recover data, when keys are lost.Processes for lawful access to cryptographic keys must recognise the distinction between keys which are used to protect confidentiality and keys which areused for other purposes only. A cryptographic key that provides for identityor integrity only (as distinct from a cryptographic key that verifies identityor integrity only) should not be made available without the consent ofthe individual or entity in lawful possession of that key. 7. LIABILITYWHETHER ESTABLISHED BY CONTRACT OR LEGISLATION, THE LIABILITYOF INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES THAT OFFER CRYPTOGRAPHIC SERVICES OR HOLD ORACCESS CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS SHOULD BE CLEARLY STATED.The liability of any individual or entity, including a government entity, that offers cryptographic services or holds or has access to cryptographic keys, should be made clear by contract or where appropriate by national legislation or international agreement. The liability of users formis use of their own keys should also be made clear. A keyholder should not be held liable for providing cryptographic keys or plaintext of encrypted data in accordance with lawful access. The party that obtains lawful access should be liable for misuse of cryptographic keys or plaintext that it has obtained. 8. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIONGOVERNMENTS SHOULD CO-OPERATE TO CO-ORDINATE CRYPTOGRAPHYPOLICIES. AS PART OF THIS EFFORT, GOVERNMENTS SHOULD REMOVE, OR AVOID CREATINGIN THE NAME OF CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY, UNJUSTIFIED OBSTACLES TO TRADE.In order to promote the broad international acceptance of cryptography and enable the full potential of the national and global information and communications networks, cryptography policies adopted by a country shouldbe co-ordinated as much as possible with similar policies of other countries.To that end, the Guidelines should be used for national policy formulation. If developed, national key management systems must, where appropriate, allow for international use of cryptography. Lawful access across national borders may be achieved through bilateral and multilateral co-operation and agreement. No government should impede the free flow of encrypted data passing through its jurisdiction merely on the basis of cryptography policy. In order to promote international trade, governments should avoid developing cryptography policies and practices which create unjustified obstaclesto global electronic commerce. Governments should avoid creating unjustified obstacles to international availability of cryptographic methods.
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